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East-Central Europe, and the Union Republics1
Roger E Kanet and Brian V Souders
The policy of perestroika introduced with such fanfare and confidence in the mid 1980s as the mechanism for 
reform and revitalization of the USSR m the end accelerated the collapse of the centrally planned, Moscow 
centered empire by the end of 1991 While few will mourn the death of this colossus its passing presents the 
region with new problems and concerns unanticipated only a few months earlier The creation of new relations 
among the successor states of the Soviet Union and the states of East-Central Europe and the Balkans will 
greatly complicate the nature of the interstate system m the region as is already evident from the friction that 
has emerged m some of those relations 2
Between the collapse of the communist led states m late 1989 and the failed Soviet coup of August 1991 a 
pattern of nationalist dissent leading to the demand for independence emerged among non Russian groups m the 
USSR—and even m Russia itself One of the objectives of this essay is to show the differences m the 
responses of the central Soviet government toward events m East-Central Europe and those occurring on Soviet 
tern tory prior to the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991 In East Central Europe the message of 
perestroika and glasnost was taken up by people whose governments had either proved incapable of 
implementing reform or had resisted all efforts at reform Those governments were toppled during the 
tumultuous summer and fall of 1989 Recognizing the illegitimacy of the regimes that had been installed and 
propped up by previous Soviet leaders and the costs that would be mvolved m attempting to keep these regimes 
in power Gorbachev and his advisors realized the irreversibility of changes in these states and the necessity of 
establishing more realistic relations with their former clients 3
However no comparable response emerged concerning relations between the Soviet central government and 
the limon republics Though domestic economic policies of restructuring and self financing the republics were 
encouraged demands for political separation that were influenced by both domestic political change and by the 
successful revolutions m East Central Europe were discouraged In fact, they were often suppressed by the all 
Union government For their part, the leaderships of the union republics saw m the policies of Mikhail 
Gorbachev a chance to exert the sovereignty theoretically guaranteed them by the Soviet Constitution In the 
case of the Baltic states this led to an active campaign—that succeeded in the wake of the August coup—to 
restore the national independence that had been suppressed at the outset of World War II
By 1989 the policy of the Soviet authorities on the issue of regional security and national security became 
contradictory At the international level they were willing to accept the loss of their dominant position in 
Eastern Europe and to work with their former allies as much as possible given the weakened economic position 
of all the states m the region to establish a new relationship that permitted them the freedom to conduct their 
own affairs
However this Soviet understanding of the desire for national independence in East Central Europe was not 
extended to the national republics of the USSR itself Prior to summer 1991 calls for sovereignty for union 
republics were met with almost unanimous agreement concerning the republics generic right to national self
1 The research for this paper was supported by the Program m Anns Control Disarmament and International Secunty of the
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign through funds provided by the John D and Catherine T M acArthur Foundation It 
is scheduled for publication in a special issue of Crossroads An International Socio-Political Journal that w ill be devoted to 
dom estic foreign linkages m Soviet policy
2. On the foreign relations of the region see Foreign Policy m 1991 ” Report on Eastern Europe (hereafter REE) 11 no 51/52 
(1991) pp 1 38 and East Central Europe and the USSR ed. by Richard F Staar (New York St. M artin s Press 1991)
3 See the comments of M ikhail Gorbachev at the M alta Summit, Pravda 5 December 1989 and the speech of Eduard
Shevardnadze to the European Parliament, Pravda 20 December 1989 See, also Alexander C  Pacek and Roger E Kanet, 
“Revolutionary Change m Eastern Europe The Societal Basis of Political Reform in Hpyong Kim and Jane Shapiro Zacek 
eds Reform in Communist Countries (W ashington The W ashington Institute 1991) pp 187 217
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However this Soviet understanding of the desire for national independence in East Central Europe was not 
extended to the national republics of the USSR itself Prior to summer 1991 calls for sovereignty for union 
republics w oe met with almost unanimous agreement concerning the republics generic right to national self 
determination However when the issue of self-determination meant the probable loss of central authority over 
the republics or the loss of Soviet territory that understanding was replaced with concerns about the challenge to 
central power that resulted m strained all Union republic relations and m some cases violence However 
despite the efforts to hold on to central authority by spring 1991 in the words of Seweryn Bialer
it was no longer a question of Gorbachev s granting concessions to the most important republics 
but rather the reverse whether they would make concessions to him to preserve some diluted central 
institutions By April when agreement was reached on the idea o f a union treaty legitimate power 
flowed not from Gorbachev to the republics but from the republics to the center and they were 
delegating only limited authority 4
The Soviet Umon and Eastern Europe Post Socialist Interstate Relations
The collapse of the communist governments m East-Central Europe m 1989 led to a major reformulation of 
Soviet thinking about former allies and of views of the effect of the collapse of socialism m the region on the 
continued existence of the USSR as a state actor The catalyst for the collapse of the forty five year old 
arrangements m East-Central Europe came m the form of Mikhail Gorbachev s policy of political renewal which 
followed the region s deteriorating economic conditions While encouraging reform in the USSR Gorbachev 
also encouraged his conservative allies in Eastern Europe to reform their socialist systems This policy of 
reform and renewal was coupled with a cessation of Cold War confrontation with the West and, thus a decreased 
need for the limited sovereignty” of the postwar era. In a speech to the European Parliament in summer 1989 
Gorbachev renounced the nght to direct Soviet intervention m the domestic affairs of his socialist allies which 
had been the Soviet approach to resolving inter bloc disputes for more than forty years 5
In the wake of the rapid collapse o f communist governments m the region Soviet leaders chose not to 
mourn the loss of their unwilling subjects and instead urged a transformation to normal state to-state relations 
with their former allies In choosing a possible model for these new ties Gorbachev cited Soviet relations with 
Finland as the ideal type for states with differing social systems 6
The implications of the loss” of Eastern Europe led to a series of acrimonious debates between the two 
mam organizations responsible for foreign policy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Commumst 
Party of the Soviet Umon (CPSU) International Department7 This split between the two organizations with 
responsibility for Soviet international affairs echoed the more general split between conservative and reformist 
forces Although by summer 1991 the CPSU International Department had already lost much of its influence 
on the formulation of foreign policy it continued to voice strong opposition to any ties between former Warsaw 
Treaty Organization members and NATO or the Western European Umon on the grounds that it would turn 
these countries into potential staging areas for a Western military presence It also supported the continued 
dominance of the USSR as the mam economic and political force m the region An official policy statement 
also calls for the ‘neutralization or at least the weakening of anti Soviet tendencies” in these countries 
Overall CPSU officials were seemingly committed to maintaining a cordon sanitaire between NATO and the 
borders of the USSR8 Conservative forces also accused officials of the MFA especially Foreign Minister
4 Seweryn Bialer “The Death of Soviet Communism ” Foreign Affairs LXXH, no 5 (1991 2) p 175
5 M S  Gorbachev “ Obshcheevropeiskii proues s idet vpered ” Pravda 7 July 1989 p 2. On the shifts in Soviet policy see 
Roger E Kanet, Superpower Cooperation in Eastern Europe m Roger E Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej eds The Cold War 
as Cooperation (London M acmillan 1991) pp 90-120
6. M S  Gorbachev “Ukrepliaia fundamenta obshche-evropeiskogo protsessa ” Pravda 26 October 1989 pp. 1 2.
7 See Suzanne Crow International Department and Foreign M inistry Disagree on Eastern Europe ” Report on the USSR
(Hereafter R USSR) m , no 25 (1991) pp 5-6 *
8 V Sekretariate TsK KPSS O razviui obstanovki v Vostochnoi Evrope i nashei politike v etom regione ” Izvestiia TsK KPSS no 
3 (1991) pp 15 16 see, also Crow International Department,” p 6
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Shevardnadze of betraying long tom  Soviet security interests and abandoning the interests of socialism in order 
to appease Gorbachev s Western supporters.9
Hard liners rallied around the argument that the loss of Eastern Europe served as a tremendous challenge to 
Soviet security On the other hand moderates including foreign ministry officials viewed the policy of 
establishing new relations with the post socialist successor states quite differently They saw the changes m 
Central Europe as logical and more beneficial extensions of the policy of a common European home ” They 
saw the Soviet border as more secure now that the Soviet Umon was conducting genuine state to-state relations 
with its former clients The loss o f the cordon sanitaire was not viewed as a loss since the West had no military 
designs on either Eastern Europe or the Soviet Um on10 While the Warsaw Pact still existed some reformers 
argued for its preservation as the mam security organization m the region based on relations that would 
demonstrate that independent development and membership in the Warsaw Pact were compatible11
Prior to the August coup and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet state efforts were pushed by the Soviets to 
replace the relationships formerly subsumed within the Warsaw Treaty Organization by a senes of bilateral 
treaties that mcluded restrictions on the foreign policy behavior of the East Europeans Only Romania actually 
agreed to such limitations and after the coup treaties were signed with other countnes that excluded such 
language12
The new realities of the collapse of the traditional patterns of economic relations m the region led to major 
displacements on many levels While the Soviet Umon had been the source of seemingly limitless supplies of 
cheap crude oil throughout 1991 difficulties of supply and the collapsing domestic economy produced a drastic 
drop in trade relations The hope did not materialize that a swift transfer to hard currency trading of goods 
among the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) members would result in an influx of 
convertible currency into the Soviet treasury Rather because of the collapse of the Soviet consumer industry 
and problems with oil and gas production the USSR was unable to pay for imports resulting in a drop of more 
than fifty percent in trade with Eastern Europe and the loss of a potential instrument of influence m the region13
The decline m trade with Eastern Europe had a catastrophic effect on these states developing market 
economies The near collapse of the Soviet economy during 1991 led to a sharp decime m entire segments of 
East-Central European industry that had produced specifically for the Soviet market Moreover the problem of 
economic stagnation m the region with growing unemployment and factory closings added to the staggering 
difficulties of the shift to a market based economy In addition the collapse of the CMEA has left the region 
with no effective mechanism to channel even barter agreements while corresponding institutions m the West 
have so far been unwilling to open their markets to East European goods14
The essential point to be noted about the policy of the USSR toward Eastern Europe after 1988 was the 
growing recognition that Soviet dominance over the region as it had existed for more than four decades was no 
longer tenable Despite new frictions and problems that arose m relations with former Soviet clients
9 See for example Anatolyi Saluzkn, in the discussion “Kakoi byt Ros su? Sovetskaia Kul tura no 8 (24 December 1990)
p 4 Aleksandr Prokhanov “Tragedua tsentralizma ” Lueraturnaia Rossua no 1 (5 January 1990) pp 4 5 See also 
Suzanne Crow “Who Lost Eastern Europe ” R USSR m , no 15 (1991) pp 1 5 for an excellent summary of the opposing 
arguments about Eastern Europe.
10 See Sergei Karaganov “Problemy evropeiskoi pohuKi SSSR " Mezhdunarodnauz zhizn (hereafter MZ) no 6 (1990) p 
91 See also Igor Orlik From Eastern Europe into a United Europe ” International Affairs no 10 (1991) pp 132 141 
11 Deputy Foreign M unster I Aboimov cited in D Makarov We are Neighbors and Allies Like Before Arqumenty i Fakty 
no 7 (17 23 February 1990) p 5 translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS SOV)
14 M arch 1990 p 37
12. See Suzanne Crow Negotiating New Treaties with Eastern Europe ” R USSR EH, no 29 (1991) p 4 Jan Obrman 
“ [Czechoslovak] Treaty signed with the Soviet Umon REE lin o  44 (1991) pp 1-4 
13 See Vlad SobeU, “In Search of a New CMEA ” REE II, no 6 (1990) John M  Kramer East Europe and the Energy Shock of
1990-91 ” Problems o f Communism, XL no 3 (1991) pp 91 93 Patrice Dabrowski, East European Trade (Part 1) The 
Loss of the Soviet M arket,” REE H, no 40 (1990) pp. 28 37
14 Ibid. See also Stephen Engelberg, “Eastern Europe s Hardships Grow as Trade with Soviets Dnes Up New York Times 6 
May 1991 pp Al C3
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Gorbachev Shevardnadze and other Soviet leaders accepted the reality of independence of the states of East 
Central Europe By the time of the August coup and the disappearance of the Soviet Umon in December 1991 
the framework of a future relationship based on mutual respect for sovereignty had been established This 
development was not extended to relations between the Soviet central government and the umon republics
The Soviet All Umon Government and the Union Republics
The willingness of the Gorbachev leadership to accept dramatic changes m the successor states of East Central 
Europe was matched to only a small degree by shifting views about the status of the umon republics While the 
Kremlin accepted the need for national revitalization and lauded the abstract concept of self-determination it 
stressed repeatedly the fact that revitalization must occur within the framework of a unified Soviet state By 
spring 1991 as his power was visibly waning Gorbachev had agreed that the terms of the relationship between 
the Center and the republics should be renegotiated but he stressed repeatedly the need to maintain unity within 
a new Union o f Sovereign Socialist Republics The overriding area of discussion in the USSR—both before 
and after the attempted coup of August 1991—concerned the need for a continued political and economic umon 
with republic leaders granted greater authority to determine their people s future so long as they remained within 
the Umon 15
The acceptance of independent states throughout Eastern Europe did not result in a comparable view in 
Moscow concerning the independence of the union republics The inflexibility on the issue of independence for 
Soviet republics was most visible m 1990 and early 1991 m the Baltic republics Although the three republics 
eventually achieved their goal of independence from the USSR m the aftermath of the failed coup all three had 
to put up a bitter and often violent struggle for the nght to self-determination
The nght of self-determination was the focal point of the argument for more self government for the union 
republics Though many Soviet analysts agreed to the inherent nghts for independence for the states of East 
Central Europe and accepted that the federal structure of the Soviet state was a facade for a tightly controlled 
unitary government, they had more vaned opinions on the nght to self-determination for Soviet nationalities 
Concern was raised about the specter of Balkanization ” even ‘Lebanomzation” of the Soviet U nion16
Though it was increasingly evident by 1990 that all efforts to reform and democratize the Soviet political 
system depended on a solution of the nationalities question17 the leadership in Moscow did not understand the 
senousness of the problem For example on the issue of self-determination for the umon republics official 
Soviet spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov noted that it is a domestic issue for us If one or two republics want 
to get out, they can get out, but it is not for us not for Moscow to encourage this kind of separation ”18 In 
what turned out to be prophetic comments on the state of nationalist movements m the USSR several Soviet 
analysts noted that the collapse of communist regimes m Eastern Europe had exercised catastrophic effects on 
mter-ethmc relations m the USSR and had m fact, encouraged separatist tendencies19
15 On the nationality issue in the USSR see Hélène Carrère d Encausse Decime o f an Empire The Soviet Socialist Republics 
in Revolt (New York Newsweek Books 1979) and Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda Soviet Disunion A History o f the 
Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York Free Press 1989) For discussions o f the cnsis in  Soviet nationalities policy 
and federalism  see Gerhard Simon “Die Desintegration der Sowjetunion durch die Nationen und Republiken ” Berichte des 
Bundesinstituts fü r ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien no. 25 (1991) and Stephan Kux Soviet Federalism A 
Comparative Perspective (New York Institute for East W est Security Studies 1990) respectively
16 See Vladimir Pustagorov Sovetskie respubliki v mirovom soobshchestve ” MZ no 4 (1991) p 6 and Ium  Borko and 
Bons Orlov Nazad K Versaliu ill vpered k Khel smki 2 Mirovaia ekononuka i mezhdunarodnaia otnoshenua no 3 
(1991) pp 65
17 See M ilovan Djilas “Eastern Europe The Revolution and Its Future ” Global Affairs V no 2 (1990) p 88
18 Gennadu Gerasimov on “Panorama,” BBC TV 13 November 1989 in FBIS SOV 15 November 1989 p. 27
19 One analyst asserted that “W ithout a doubt the collapse o f the East European alliance coincided with the separan st 
tendencies o f the USSR. And the rather senous general psychological impact caused by the breakaway of our allies remains 
Another added “The revolunons in Eastern Europe made for a worsening of the political situation and inter-ethnic relations m 
the Soviet Umon prim arily in the Baltic republics and Moldova which, m turn created difficult problems for Soviet foreign 
policy ” Valeru Mustasov “Vostochnaia Evropa Taifiin peremen ” Pravda 18 March 1991 p  5 Oriik in  From Eastern 
Europe into a United Europe ” p 136
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The disintegration of central authority in the Soviet Union had spread already by late 1989 to the point 
where the issue was raised of negotiating a new Treaty of the Union to update the original agreement Proposed 
policies of self financing republics and limited republic home rule were coupled with the acceptance of central 
control over several key areas the military and defense the energy grid (especially nuclear energy) the 
transportation system and foreign policy 20 However the claim for a monopoly to conduct foreign policy by 
the center alone countered not only the Soviet Constitution but also the realities of the p ast21 In addition the 
responsibilities of a self financing republic toward the center or toward other republics remained unclear 22
Other problems found m the eventual draft treaty included the vague handling of the issue of non signatories 
of the treaty The distribution of all Union assets and debts remained largely a matter for later negotiations as 
did the plans for a shift to a market economy Vladimir Kusin and other analysts noted that the creation of any 
form of federal or confederal government requires time to develop to become part of the national political 
culture Kusin argued that the proposed new union treaty would be more likely than not, a stopgap measure 
meant to prevent the further disintegration of the Union,”23
The sometimes rancorous debates over the right to national self-determination and the creation of a new 
federal (or confederal) unit on the territory of the Soviet Union led toan increased awareness of the massive 
problems presented by the growth at the republic—and even sub-republic—level of nationalism and feelings of 
exploitation by the center Despite the formal federal structure of the Soviet state the de facto unitary and 
hierarchical nature of the political system gave little effective decision making authority to the union republics 
Some reformers saw the drive for sovereignty as a logical step m putting the federal system enshrined m the 
USSR Constitution of 1977 into operation 24 One such argument went as follows
Yes we are for the self-determination of nations even as far as the creation of new states—therefore we 
positively accept the sovereignty of all nations even those on USSR territory Only a full and 
unconditional recognition of the nght of each nation to independence will be able to stop the 
centrifugal process and establish the beginnings of integration tendencies in the USSR 25
In this debate conservatives tended to view the disintegration of the Union as infringing on the rights of 
ethnically mixed populations within each of the union republics One representative of the CPSU International 
Department characterized the drive for Baltic sovereignty as an unnatural separation of what was an histone part 
of both Europe and Russia. He claimed that the representatives of the drive for independence of the Baltic states 
did not portray accurately the interests of all members of the local population 26
20 For an example of the self financing plans of Estonia, the republic that led the dnve for economic independence see “Law of 
the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic The Foundations of Economic Accountability of the Estonian SSR” and “Summary of 
Cost Accounting in the Estonian SSR ” Sovetskata Estomia 23 May 1989 translated in FBIS SOV 12 V I1989 pp 62 67 
and 19 June 1989 pp 101 110 respectively
21 The long standing presence of Ukrainian and Belorussian seats in the United Nations and the growing foreign policy ties 
between individual union republics and other states were evidence of the erosion of such a monopoly See Tamara J Resler 
“National Assertiveness and Foreign Policy m the USSR,” paper presented at the annual m eetings of the International Studies 
Association Vancouver BC Canada, M arch 1991 Jan Arveds Trepans “Baltic Foreign Policy in 1990 R USSR ffl.n o  2 
(1991) pp 15 18 and Jan S Adams “One Foreign Policy or Twelve? R USSR m  no 48 (1991) pp 16-19
22 Sergei Cheshko Ekonomichesku suverem tet i natsional nyi vopros ” Kommunist no 2 (1989) p 90
23 Vladim ir Kusm “The Confederal Search ” REE H, no. 27 (1991) pp 35-47
24 According to  the 1977 Constitution the rights guaranteed to the union republics grant each one the nght to conduct foreign 
policy to have foreign diplom atic representation and to join international organizations and the nght to  leave the Umon 
freely See Konstitutsiia SSSR (Moscow Iundicheskaia Literature, 1986) pp 21 25
25 Vladim ir Stupishin “Svoboda vybora i pravo natsu na samoopredeleme ” MZ no. 2 (1991) pp 13 16
26 Valentin A Aleksandrov Pnbaluka—v zerkale odnoi diskussu,” MZ no 1 (1990) p 63 Aleksandrov s argument was 
countered by those members of the Russian minonty m the region who would prefer either to return to Russia or remain 
willingly in the newly independent Baltic states See Vladimir Lebedev Peame valja töötama vene kogukonna lakhurmse 
programmi,” (We Must Work out the Program for the Departure o f the Russian Community) Reede Tallinn no 34 (24 
August 1990) According to opinion polls taken m Estonia, as early as 1989 nearly forty percent of non Es tom ans 
supported parties that favored independence. See “M ainor Public Opinion Research Center Reports Noorte Haal 11 
November 1989 translated in FBIS SOV 20 November 1989 pp 89 92
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Until summer 1991 the government m Moscow tended to follow a conservative even reactionary policy 
toward the republics, rather than adopting a more reformist attitude toward the independence of its territorial 
units The attacks by the Soviet military during 1989 91 on civilians in Georgia, Lithuania, and Latvia who 
were protesting various forms of central authority brought to mind similar interventions m Budapest and Prague 
This is especially true of the military crackdowns in Vilnius and Riga m early 1991 even though the level of 
coercion and the degree of cohesion among the supporters of the crackdowns was nowhere near so strong as had 
been the case in Eastern Europe 27
In addition to the use of military force to deter the dnve to independence central authorities also used 
various forms of political pressure The CPSU organs condemned the splits in each of the Baltic states 
communist parties as well as the growth of republic level non-communist parties Political groupings which 
favored continued linkage with the Union contributed to political unrest in each of the Baltic states with 
representatives of the conservative Russian-dominated Intermovement attempting to storm the Estonian 
Parliament in Tallinn during the unrest there Pro-Union radio stations such as Estonia s Radio Nadezhda, 
broadcast their messages from the safety of Soviet military bases
Economic pressure was perhaps the most effective of weapons far more so in the Baltics than would have 
been possible in Eastern Europe The blockade of Lithuanian energy supplies following its March 1990 
declaration of independence left the republic largely at an economic standstill Not only did this pressure affect 
the Lithuanian Parliament s decision to negotiate independence with the central authorities it also probably 
played a role in the form of both Estoma s and Latvia s decisions to announce periods of transition” to 
independence instead of following Lithuania s lead.28
The Republics and the Center Towards Full Independence
The republics took the weakening of the central government as the opportunity to develop their own political 
movements such as breakaway communist parties separate from the CPSU and individual republican national 
fronts and also their own political institutions and foreign ministries independent of the MFA 29
The rejection of the old ways of doing busmess led to major problems and dislocations for the leadership of 
the union republics and especially for those seeing actual independence from the Soviet Union Some writers 
argued that the Baltic states were capable of self financing largely as a result of the comparatively high level of 
socio-economic development of the region30 However the lineage of the all Umon economy and the all Union 
budget with those of the republics led to major dilemmas concerning supplies of raw materials finished 
products and capital The problems of countries in East Central Europe in shifting to convertible currency 
trading has been dramatically compounded at the level of the Soviet Umon republic because of the acute 
shortage of hard currency at the republic level As former Estonian prime minister Edgar Savisaar pointed out 
shortly before the coup the Baltic states had less to fear from tanks than from banks ”31
Because of the Soviet Umon s highly centralized and inefficient system of production the union republics 
were also saddled with inefficient industries and enterprises whose loyalties lay outside the republic with the 
central ministries For the most part these enterprises relied for a major portion of their raw matenals on 
sources distant from that particular production facility Given the hostile reaction of the central government to
27 See Vladimir K Kusin “Patterns of Intervention Budapest, Prague Vilnius and Riga, R USSR IH, no 4 (1991) p  4 On 
the attack in Tbilisi see M anna Pavlova-Silvanskaia, cited in E Kaliadina, “A Pit Instead of a Crystal Castle 
Komsomolskaia Pravda 3 January 1990* translated m FBIS SOV 5 January 1990 p 28
28 See Stephen Foye “Gorbachev Denies Responsibility for Crackdown,” R USSR III, no 4 (1991) pp 1 3 and John 
Tedstrom “Baltic Independence The Economic Dimension R USSR m , no 6 (1991) pp 22 28
29 See Toomas lives “The Congress of Estoma,” and Rima Kionka “The Congress Convenes ” R USSR H, no 12 (1990) pp 
31 32 and 32 35 respectively for discussion of the initial meeting of the successor parliam ent of the interw ar Republic of 
Estom a
30 Chesko Ekonomichesku suverem tet i natsional n il vopros ” p 88
31 Remarks at a U S Helsinki Commission hearing W ashington 7 V 1990* cited m Rima Kionka, Hard Currency and High 
Politics m the Baltic Republics ” R USSR m  no 27 (1991) p 22.
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overt attempts to achieve independence the Baltic states refusal to sign or even consider the new all Umon 
treaty resulted m even more severe disruptions of supplies to these enterprises and to others that supplied the 
local m arket32
The issues facing the union republics on the economic front had many similarities with the situation in 
East Central Europe The industries established m many republics w oe inefficient consumers of energy and 
producers of low quality goods However the lack of hard currency with which to acquire more efficient Western 
technology or alternative energy sources forced the republics to retain their trade ties with the Soviet Union 
Also the lack of funds on the part of the center resulted during 1990-1991 m a drastic drop m the amount of 
goods that the center could purchase from the republics In addition, adherence to old managerial practices with 
the fulfillment of the plan coming first and quality somewhere far down the list of priorities has only gradually 
begun to change Finally even at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Umon in December 1991 the 
breakdown of the centralized system of distribution of goods had yet to be replaced with anything even vaguely 
resembling a m arket
On the other hand, the spread of economic chaos had potential benefits for some of the union republics 
With centralized control over resources vanishing regions with deficit goods were able to strike deals with other 
republics and, indeed other countries to sell their products on their own rather than relying on the center either 
to sell their goods or to supply them with the consumer goods that they require
The union republics and the Baltic states in particular took the opportunity of their calls for independence 
to begin establishing contacts outside the Soviet Umon The foreign ministers of the Baltic republics logged 
many miles traveling m search of official recognition of their independence from the USSR and of the monetary 
support to finance iL Polish and Lithuanian leaders exchanged visits though Poland withheld official 
recognition of Lithuania s independence until after the coup Estonia s foreign minister traveled throughout 
Scandinavia in search of similar recognition All three Baltic foreign ministers arrived in Pans for the 
continuation of the Conference on Secunty and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) talks m Apnl 1991 as 
observers but at Soviet insistence were not permitted to attend the m eetings33
To a certain extent the all Umon government accepted and even encouraged the development of economic 
autonomy among the umon republics34 This support had its limits however Ukrainian attempts to issue their 
own coupons for the rationing of goods were met with strong resistance from Moscow as were the initial 
attempts to reintroduce the kroon as the legal currency in Estonia and to reestablish separate postage stamps for 
Lithuania and Latvia. More importantly the blockades strikes and general lack of supplies affected the entire 
chain of production The collapse of the command economy led to decreases in expected deliveries to many 
state run enterprises that relied on goods from throughout the Union These bottlenecks sent npples throughout 
the entire economy for as one area slowed production it stopped its export of goods thus leading to a never 
ending senes of shortages throughout the system
On the political front events were just as disruptive for the all Union system of management and control 
The political instability of 1991 led some to claim that it would be possible for republics to buy” their 
independence According to the Estonian foreign minister a Gosplan document dated 8 May 1991 offered the 
following possibility All Umon industries would be sold by the center to the governments of the new states 
and then leased back to the center The all Union debt would be divided proportionately among the fifteen union 
republics and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the territory of those republics which fulfilled these
32 See Runa Kionka “How W ill Estonia Cope After the Union Treaty?” R USSR m  no 30 (1991) pp 27 29
33 See Stephen R Burant, “Polish Lithuanian Relations Past, Present, and Future Problems o f Communism XL no 3 
(1991) p 78 Richard J  Knckus “Lithuania s Polish Question R USSR m , no 48 (1991) pp 20-23 Nils Muizmcks 
“The Emerging Baltic Foreign Pokey Establishment,” R USSR II no 35 (1990) pp 17 19 relevant chapters m Soviet 
Foreign Policy in Transition ed. by Roger E. Kanet, et aL (Cambridge New York Cambridge University Press 1992) and 
Trapans “Baltic Foreign Policy in 1990
34 See Chesko “Ekonomicheskn suverem tet i natsional m i vopros ”
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requirements The foreign minister fixed the cost of such a policy to Estonia at about one billion U S dollars 
but noted that Estonians would sacrifice in order to pay this pnce for independence35
The Coup and Its Aftermath The Dissolution of the USSR
The failed coup of 19 August 1991 accelerated the multifaceted process of disintegration of the Soviet Umon and 
culminated m its formal dissolution four months later The three Baltic states regamed their national 
independence already m the first half of September and, much as their neighbors m East Central Europe now 
faced the uncertainties of establishing independent economic and political systems Eleven of the remaining 
twelve former union republics all but two of which declared their independence from the Soviet Umon m the 
weeks immediately following the collapse of the coup and have now gained formal international recognition 
have established an as yet amorphous Commonwealth of Independent States through which they have agreed to 
cooperate in areas of mutual concern—military security transportation etc
The coup represented a desperate attempt by a handful of hard liners to stem the tide of the changes that had 
been unleashed by Gorbachev s reform program and were now sweeping the Soviet Union and threatening its 
collapse Chief among these changes were those associated with the nationality question and with the 
relationships between the central authorities m Moscow and the umon republics Though Gorbachev had fought 
assiduously to suppress secessionist demands and to retain central authority over the entire country his personal 
authority and that of the central state and party apparatus were in sm ous decline The new Union Treaty that 
had been negotiated m spring 1991 and was to be signed on 20 August, recognized the changed political 
relationships between the center and the republics The draft agreement illustrated the growing power of 
republic level officials such as Boris El tsrn in Russia and Nursultan Nazarbaev in Khazakhstan and of the fact 
that political initiative had shifted from the center to the republics The timing of the coup was meant to 
forestall the signing of the new Treaty of the Umon which would have legalized further decentralization of state 
power
Rather than salvaging centralized authority the coup speeded up the process of disintegration The three 
Baltic republics left the Umon while eleven of the remaining twelve declared their independence but continued 
discussions about future cooperation In the ensuing months the signing of the Treaty was put on hold while 
the republics jockeyed to strengthen their demands for greater authority A treaty of economic community 
between eleven of the remaining republics and the center was signed in October with Ukraine acceding to the 
treaty on 4 November 1991 All the while President Gorbachev fought to maintain the authority of the central 
government36 In a televised speech on 3 December 1991 he repeated his plea to the republics not to leave the 
Umon and warned of due consequences even war should his arguments not be heeded.37
The unpasse between President Gorbachev and the presidents of the union republics was broken on 8 
December 1991 with the announcement that the presidents of the three Slavic republics—Belarus Russia and 
Ukraine—had agreed to form a Commonwealth of Independent States thereby undercutting Gorbachev s efforts 
to retain a confederate state with a strong central presidency Within a week all the remaining republics except 
Georgia agreed to join the Commonwealth On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigned as president of the 
Soviet Umon and a rump session of the Supreme Soviet dissolved the USSR bringing to an end the seven 
decade experiment m centralized federalism ”38
In addition to the accelerated deterioration of the Umon in the aftermath of the August coup the 
conservative forces that had grudgingly accepted the collapse of socialism m East-Central Europe were now
35 Foreign M inister Lennart M en, a ted  in Harald Hamnn Estland kan köpa sin frihet Sovjenstk dokument ger nya 
m ojligheter fdr delrepubliker att lamna Unionen Dagens Nyheter Stockholm 28 May 1991 p 9
36 See for example Ann Sheehy “The Umon Treaty A Further Setback ” R USSR HL no. 49 (1991) pp 1-4
37 R USSR m , no 50 (1991) pp 31 2
38 Alexander Rahr Is Gorbachev Finished?” and Stephen Foye From Umon to Commonwealth W ill the Armed Forces Go 
along?” R USSR m , no 51/52 (1991) pp 1 7 Gorbachev Last Soviet Leader Resigns US Recognizes Republics 
Independence ” New York Times 26 December 1991 p A l
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forced to watch it being dismantled in their own country The CPSU was shut down and m some republics 
outlawed altogether The KGB was disbanded in its old form and its functions were placed under control of the 
military and a civilian board of control Investigations of treason and abuse of power began already in fall 1991 
While the opponents of decentralization and of the granting of a gradual increase m republican self determination 
may have thought that they were savmg the Soviet multiethnic state and socialism by their actions during the 
coup and in the two years pnor to it, in the end they managed to contribute to the sudden and cataclysmic 
dissolution of the Soviet Union
The parallels between the collapse of the Soviet central government in the months following the coup and 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe two years earlier are readily apparent—primarily the loss of 
legitimacy of the communist system and the growing demand for national independence In both cases the 
failure of Soviet leaders including President Mikhail Gorbachev to understand the strength of the nationalist 
revival that had been unleashed by the reforms contributed to the collapse After Gorbachev s acceptance of full 
independence for the client states of East-Central Europe it became increasingly difficult to deny similar claims 
m the Baltics and the Caucasus By summer 1991 Gorbachev and the central authorities m Moscow had already 
lost most of their authority over the republics The coup which represented an attempt m part to redress the 
balance of power between center and periphery actually destroyed whatever authority and legitimacy the center 
retained.
As the events of the next four months played out, it became increasingly clear that the life span of the 
multiethnic Soviet state had run its course What is not evident at the time of writing in mid 1992 is the degree 
of success that Russia and the other successor states will have m establishing stable political systems and 
functioning economies The transformation to market economies the search for new markets and the quest for 
security in a period of lively regional instability will possibly force the successor states to develop new forms of 
cooperation within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States However it is also possible 
that regional groupings of the newly independent states will be established or that growing tensions will lead to 
conflict among the Soviet successor states
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